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I. INTRODUCTION
A court may dismiss a shareholder's derivative suit' if a special
committee of disinterested and independent directors investigates the
shareholder's allegations and concludes that litigation is not in the corpo-
ration's best interests.
2
Dismissal, however, is not a foregone conclusion. The court may
grant a motion to dismiss only if no genuine issues of fact exist on four
questions. (1) Do the committee members have an "interest" in the
transaction that the shareholder challenges? (2) Are the committee
members independent of the corporation and its management? (3) Did
the committee conduct a good faith reasonable investigation? (4) Does
the committee have a reasonable basis for recommending dismissal?
3
Thus, a corporation must carefully select the special committee, and
the committee must objectively, thoroughly, and in good faith investigate
the shareholder's action. This Article discusses how to set up a special
committee and what the committee should do.
II. BACKGROUND
Shareholders can bring a lawsuit on behalf of a corporation to re-
dress corporate injuries in certain circumstances." Typically, sharehold-
ers allege that directors have mismanaged the corporation or have
otherwise breached their fiduciary duties.' Shareholders may claim, for
1. A shareholder brings a derivative suit on behalf of a corporation to redress a corporate
injury. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 399 (5th ed. 1979). The corporation is a necessary party
and the relief granted is a judgment against a third person in favor of the corporation. Id.
2. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
3. Id. A court examines all four issues where demand is excused. Where demand is not
excused, the interest and independence of committee members are not at issue. Id. But see
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338 (7th Cir. 1990) (when federal law governs
whether demand must be made, shareholder does not concede by making demand that direc-
tors are independent or disinterested). In some states, including Delaware, a court may not
dismiss a shareholder's derivative suit even if the committee is disinterested and independent,
conducted a reasonable investigation, and has a reasonable basis for recommending dismissal.
The court may apply its own business judgment and dismiss only if it determines that litigation
is not in the corporation's best interests. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 789.
4. See, eg., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
5. See, eg., Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246, 249 (Del. 1970) (mismanagement,
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example, that directors have converted corporate assets, 6 approved exces-
sive compensation,' violated federal securities laws,' or manipulated cor-
porate machinery to deprive stockholders of a right to consider changes
in control, such as takeover proposals.9
Before filing a complaint, a shareholder must normally demand that
a board of directors redress the alleged wrong."° This pre-suit demand
permits directors, the managers of a corporation, to bring an action
themselves or otherwise to resolve issues that a shareholder raises. 1'
If a shareholder fails to make such a demand, the shareholder may
have no standing to sue on behalf of the corporation. 2 Accordingly,
when a shareholder files a derivative complaint without making a de-
mand, a corporation can move to dismiss for lack of standing. 3
A court will deny a corporation's motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, however, if a shareholder's demand is excused. Demand is ex-
cused where a request that a board act would have been futile. 4 Such a
request is futile where plaintiff's allegations raise a reasonable doubt as to
whether: (1) a majority of directors were disinterested in or independent
waste); Shapiro v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. 7339, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. July 30, 1985) (waste,
entrenchment, and breach of fiduciary duty); Wilen v. Pollution Control Indus., No. 7254, slip
op. at 8-9 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15, 1984) (fraud, overreaching); Harifi v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215,
217 (Del. Ch. 1974) (mismanagement, waste), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 347 A.2d 133
(Del. 1975).
6. See, e.g., Mazzetti v. Shepherd, No. 8198, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1986).
7. See, e.g., Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610, 613 (Del. Ch. 1974).
8. See, e.g., Margolies v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., No. 8244, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23,
1986).
9. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (the shareholder must allege, "with particularity," the efforts
that plaintiff made "to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors ... and the
reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort"); DEL. CH.
Cr. R. 23.1 (same pleading requirement as federal rule).
Other states either follow similar statutes or require, by judicial decision, that a share-
holder make a pre-suit demand. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.,
221 Mass. 530, 109 N.E. 452 (1915); CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(2) (West 1982); N.Y. Bus.
CoRp. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1963); see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d
1338 (7th Cir. 1990) (federal law governs demand requirement when claim is based on federal
substantive law).
11. See Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1031 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988).
13. The corporation may also move to dismiss because the shareholder (1) held no stock
when the corporation took the action that the shareholder challenges, (2) cannot adequately
represent shareholders, or (3) asserts a personal, rather than a corporate, injury. See, e.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
14. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). But see Kamen, 908 F.2d
at 1343 (futility does not excuse demand).
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from the challenged transaction,15 or (2) directors exercised business
judgment when they effected a challenged transaction.16 If a court denies
a corporation's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a shareholder may
proceed with a derivative action. 7
A court also may deny a corporation's motion to dismiss for lack of
standing where a shareholder makes a proper demand on directors, but
the directors wrongfully refuse to pursue or reasonably consider an al-
leged claim.18 Directors wrongfully refuse a demand where they fail to
exercise proper business judgment in rejecting the demandV9-- for exam-
ple, where they reject the demand in bad faith or without deliberating.20
A shareholder may proceed with a derivative suit where it shows that a
board wrongfully rejected its demand.21
Until 1981, once a shareholder proved either circumstances excus-
ing demand or that a board wrongfully rejected a demand, some Dela-
ware courts did not permit dismissal of a derivative action short of
judgment or settlement.22 In the 1981 landmark case of Zapata Corp. v.
15. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814; see also Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., No. 9477, slip op.
at 28-29 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1989) (demand excused where majority of directors would receive
special dividend from challenged transaction and several directors were also senior executives
of company that would combine with corporation under challenged transaction); Lewis v.
Aronson, No. 6919, slip op. at 11-12 (Del. Ch. May 17, 1985) (demand excused where plaintiff
alleged that corporation granted employment contract to majority shareholder in exchange for
dropping claims against other corporations in which majority of directors were officers and
directors).
Demand is most clearly futile where the challenged transaction actively involves a major-
ity of directors. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815. The First and Ninth Circuits do not consider
demand in such circumstances futile unless the plaintiff also shows that the challenged transac-
tion involves fraud, self dealing for a direct pecuniary benefit, or approval of a transaction
completely unrelated to a corporate purpose. See Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of De-
rivative Actions Under the Business Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAW. 401,
410 n.50 (1983).
16. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814; see also Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., No. 7861, slip
op. at 8 (Del. Ch. May 7, 1986) (demand excused where plaintiff specifically alleged that board
approved sale of corporate assets while ignoring obvious opportunity to obtain higher price);
Stein v. Orloff, No. 7276, slip op. at 14 (Del. Ch. May 30, 1985) (demand excused where
plaintiffs specifically alleged that transaction was waste of corporate assets).
Demand is not excused just because a corporation creates a special litigation committee to
investigate a shareholder's claims. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990).
17. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 784 n.10.
20. See, eg., Lewis v. Hett, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 240 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 1984).
21. Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 929 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988);
see also In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout See. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1134 (D.
Del. 1988); Levine v. Smith, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,581, at
97,604 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 1987).
22. Various courts applying Delaware law had dismissed derivative suits when boards or
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Maldonado,23 the Delaware Supreme Court approved early dismissal of
shareholder derivative actions even where circumstances excused, or a
board wrongfully rejected, a demand.24
In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Delaware
Court of Chancery's ruling that a shareholder had an absolute right to
prosecute, to judgment or settlement, a properly commenced derivative
action.2" The Delaware Supreme Court held that, under certain circum-
stances, a committee of directors26 may cause a properly initiated deriva-
tive suit to be dismissed.27 This Article discusses those circumstances. 28
III. DIscussIoN
A. Overview
A court may dismiss a properly commenced 29 shareholder's deriva-
tive action when a special litigation committee, after investigating the
shareholder's claims, determines that the lawsuit is not in the corpora-
tion's best interests. The corporation moves for dismissal on the special
committee's recommendation.30
their committees determined that dismissal was in the corporation's best interests. See, ag.,
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980);
Abramovitz, 672 F.2d at 1025; Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
23. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
24. Id. at 788-89. Other states had already approved such a procedure. See, ag.,
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
25. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782.
26. A committee that evaluates a shareholder's derivative action and can cause its dismis-
sal is referred to herein as a "special litigation committee," "special committee," or
"committee."
27. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
28. Discussion is not limited to Delaware law. Whether and under what circumstances a
board may appoint a special litigation committee is a matter of state law, except where state
law frustrates a federal policy. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,477 (1979); see also Mills v.
Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (N.D. IM. 1982). The laws of the state of incorpora-
tion govern a corporation. Burks, 441 U.S. at 478. Because Delaware is a popular state of
incorporation, Delaware courts have developed much of the case law on special litigation com-
mittees. This Article reports the law of other states as well.
Close corporations also use special litigation committees. See, ag., Grafman v. Century
Broadcasting Corp., No. 8238 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file);
Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 821, 556 N.E.2d 51, 57 (1990).
29. A shareholder derivative action is properly commenced where demand is excused or
was wrongfully rejected and the shareholder otherwise has standing. See supra notes 10-21
and accompanying text.
30. Iowa courts may require that the recommendation come from a court-appointed "spe-
cial panel" rather than a director-chosen special litigation committee. Miller v. Register &
Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983). Under Iowa law, directors who
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The motion to dismiss is neither a traditional motion to dismiss nor
a traditional motion for summary judgment. 1 Rather, it is a hybrid 32 -a
court applies summary judgment standards to the special committee's
work.33 Accordingly, unless federal law prevents it,34 a derivative action
may be dismissed where no issue of fact exists on four questions:35
(1) Do special committee members have an interest in the challenged
transaction?
(2) Are special committee members independent from management
and the corporation?
are also defendants in the shareholder's suit cannot delegate to a special litigation committee
the power to evaluate the shareholder's claims. Id. Therefore, where the shareholder names
an entire board or its majority as defendants, the corporation cannot use a special litigation
committee. Id. But see id. at 719 (Wolles, J., dissenting) ("[a special panel is] untried, un-
tested, and a potentially unsound system for court appointment of corporate committees").
The majority rule is to the contrary. A board-appointed special litigation committee can
decide whether a shareholder's suit is in the corporation's best interests even where the share-
holder names a majority of the board as defendants. See, eg., Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,
603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980);
Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (applying federal common
law); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-86 (Del. 1981).
31. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 506 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
32. The "motion finds no ready pigeonhole," and is "perhaps best considered as a hybrid
summary judgment motion for dismissal because the stockholder plaintiff's standing to main-
tain the suit has been lost." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.
33. A court applies the summary judgment standard to a special committee's action or
inaction, not to the facts and circumstances of plaintiff's claims. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 519.
The Kaplan court applied summary judgment standards, although it criticized the sum-
mary judgment motion as a "technically inappropriate procedural vehicle" to test the commit-
tee's work. Id. at 512 n.*. The motion concedes no liability and does not adjudicate the
merits, or even the pleading, of plaintiff's case. "[lIt is addressed necessarily to the reasonable-
ness of dismissing the complaint prior to trial without any concession of liability on the part of
the defendants and without adjudicating the merits of the cause of action itself." Id. at 507.
34. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979).
35. Courts that follow Zapata put the burden of proving that no issue of fact exists on
defendants (directors and officers). See, eg., Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. 1493, 1496,
1500 (D. Md. 1985); Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788-89; Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 508; see also Lewis v.
Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 970 (Del. Ch. 1985) (motion to dismiss denied because corporation
failed to establish that special litigation committee was disinterested); Houle v. Low, 407 Mass.
810, 822, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (1990) ("burden of proving that these procedural requirements
have been met must rest, in all fairness, on the party capable of making that proof-the corpo-
ration").
Courts that follow Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 635, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1979), put the burden of proving that no issue of fact exists on plaintiff
shareholder. See Lasker v. Burks, 426 F. Supp. 844, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 567 F.2d
1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 520; Falkenberg v.
Baldwin, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 1980).
Where demand is not excused, a court will not review issues under the first two questions.
Interest and independence of special committee members are not relevant to the court's in-
quiry. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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(3) Did the committee reasonably and in good faith investigate the
shareholder's claims?
(4) Does the committee have a reasonable basis for recommending that
the corporation move to dismiss the litigation?
In some states, including Delaware, dismissal is not assured even if a
corporation passes these four tests. Under certain circumstances, some
courts take a discretionary "second step" and evaluate the merits of the
shareholder's suit as well. If these courts find that litigation is in the
corporation's best interests36 or that "law and public policy" favor the
litigation, the shareholder's suit will proceed despite the special commit-
tee's recommendation.37
36. See, eg., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 380 (6th Cir. 1984); Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892, 897 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Clark v.
Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029
(1981).
37. Under Delaware law, where demand is excused, a court first inquires "into the inde-
pendence and good faith of the committee and the basis supporting its conclusions." Zapata,
430 A.2d at 788. Then the court will "determine, applying its own independent business judg-
ment, whether the motion [to dismiss] should be granted." Id. at 789. In the second step of its
evaluation, the court "should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law
and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests." Id. The court, in this second
step, considers "matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's best inter-
ests." Id. The second step is "wholly within the discretion of the court." Kaplan v. Wyatt,
499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985). The second step "is intended to thwart instances where [a
corporation] would simply prematurely terminate a shareholder's grievance deserving of fur-
ther consideration...." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. Where a shareholder has made a demand,
the issue of whether the demand is excused is moot, and courts that follow Zapata do not
reach the second step. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 1990) (citing Stotland v.
GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421, 422-23 (Del. 1983)). But see Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp.
1275, 1283 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (applying Delaware law, demand does not "itself bar all such
[second-step] review in this court under Delaware law.").
Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia follow
Zapata. See In re General Tire & Rubber Co., 726 F.2d 1075, 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 858 (1984) (applying Ohio law); Joy, 692 F.2d at 892 (applying Connecticut law court
followed Zapata where shareholder claimed corporation directly suffered financial harm);
Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Buckley, 613 F. Supp. at 1499;
Holmstrom v. Coastal Indus., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 963, 987-88 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Abella v.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 799-800 (E.D. Va. 1982); Alford v. Shaw, 320
N.C. 465, 468-69, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325-26 (1987).
Massachusetts courts take a "second step," but not the Zapata second step. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court, in Houle, 407 Mass. at 824-25, 556 N.E.2d at 59, reversed summary
judgment and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether the committee was "independ-
ent and unbiased." Id. The Houle court thus did not apply a "second step" but declared that
Massachusetts courts must determine "whether the committee reached a reasonable and prin-
cipled decision." Id. Even where a committee "is independent and conducts a thorough inves-
tigation, the judge may conclude that the committee's decision is contrary to the great weight
of evidence." Id. The court must consider such factors as:
the likelihood of a judgment in the plaintiff's favor, the expected recovery as com-
pared to out-of-pocket costs, whether the corporation itself took corrective action,
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B. Appointing a Special Litigation Committee
1. Procedure
a. when should a board appoint a special litigation committee?
A board of directors should appoint a special litigation committee
only after a corporation makes standing or jurisdictional objections.38
When a board requests that a special committee investigate and evaluate
a shareholder's claims, the board may relinquish any right to act until
the special committee has done its work. For example, after it vests ple-
nary authority in a special committee, a board may not move to dismiss
the suit-even if plaintiff failed to make a proper demand.39 The board
can only move to stay the shareholder's action pending the special com-
whether the balance of corporate interests warrant dismissal, and whether dismissal
would allow any defendant who has control of the corporation to retain a significant
improper benefit.
Id. at 825, 556 N.E.2d at 59. The corporation bears the burden of proof under Massachusetts
law. Id. at 824, 556 N.E.2d at 59.
New York forecloses a court's inquiry into the merits of the shareholder's suit. See
Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,419 N.Y.S.2d 920. TheAuerbach court, unlike the
Zapata and Houle courts, believed that courts are "ill-equipped" to make business decisions.
Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926. Absent evidence of bad faith or fraud,
courts should respect the special litigation committee decision. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. Under Auerbach, a court determines only whether disinterested, in-
dependent directors properly investigated the shareholder's claims. Id. at 630-31, 393 N.E.2d
at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926-27.
California and Minnesota adopted the New York Auerbach rule. See Gaines v.
Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 771 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1145 (1982); Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
Michigan follows Auerbach where plaintiff does not allege that the directors personally
gained from the challenged transaction. See Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 688
(E.D. Mich. 1980). Otherwise, a Michigan court would scrutinize a non-independent commit-
tee's decision to dismiss the suit.
Alabama follows Genzer. See Roberts v. Alabama Power Co., 404 So. 2d 629, 632 (Ala.
1981).
38. The board, for example, may move to dismiss because the shareholder failed to make a
pre-suit demand, failed to hold stock at the time of the challenged transaction or is not a
stockholder, cannot adequately represent other shareholders, or does not assert a corporate
injury. See supra notes 4-21 and accompanying text.
39. See, eg., Abbey v. Computer & Communications Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d 368, 373 (Del.
Ch. 1983) (by appointing special litigation committee and delegating full authority to handle
derivative action, board conceded that plaintiff need not make a demand, and individual direc-
tors lost standing to move to dismiss before special committee made its recommendation);
Richardson v. Graves, No. 6617 (Del. Ch. June 17, 1983) (LEXIS, States library, Del file)
(when board appoints an independent litigation committee, board concedes that it cannot
make unbiased decision). But see Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990) (appoint-
ment of special committee does not necessarily moot question whether lawsuit properly initi.
ated); Peller v. Southern Co., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,714,
at 98,311 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 1988) (applying Delaware law).
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mittee's deliberations.4°
In Abbey v. Computer & Communications Technology Corp.,41 the
Delaware Court of Chancery refused to consider a motion to dismiss a
shareholder's suit on standing grounds. The corporation brought the
motion before a special committee had finished its investigation.42 Hav-
ing delegated to the committee "full, complete and binding authority...
to take whatever action it deemed appropriate," the corporation
"divest[ed] itself of any power to make a decision on the pending suit."'43
A board should appoint a special committee, however, before the
board determines whether a shareholder's suit has merit. In Swenson v.
Thibaut,' a board voted to create a special litigation committee after it
voted that a shareholder's suit had no merit. 5 All directors voted
against the suit."6 The board then appointed several directors to a special
litigation committee, which later recommended that the corporation
move to dismiss the suit.47 The North Carolina Court of Appeals denied
the corporation's motion to dismiss. 4 The court raised, sua sponte, an
issue of fact on the committee's independence that precluded dismissal.
49
The court held that special committee members lacked independence be-
cause they had prejudged the suit.50
b. how much authority should a board delegate?
A board must delegate full and final authority to a special litigation
committee to decide whether a corporation should prosecute a share-
holder's action or move to dismiss it."1 If a special committee has no
40. Computer & Communications Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d at 375.
41. 457 A.2d 368 (Del. Ch. 1983).
42. Id. at 374.
43. Id. at 373. The plaintiff made a demand and then filed suit, alleging that demand was
excused. Id. at 370-71. The board responded to the suit only by appointing a special litigation
committee. The board did not challenge the plaintiff's allegation that demand was excused by
moving to dismiss the suit, nor in any other way. Id.
Where a board first moves to dismiss and then appoints a special committee in response to
a tardy demand, however, it may pursue a motion to dismiss. See Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 776.
44. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
45. Id. at 107, 250 S.E.2d at 298.
46. Id. at 106, 250 S.E.2d at 298.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 107, 250 S.E.2d at 298.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 106, 250 S.E.2d at 297. The special committee's decision must be more than
"advisory." In Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court dismissed a
shareholder's suit on the special committee's recommendation because, among other reasons,
the special committee had the board's "full authority." Id. at 517. The court stated, "In no
sense was the decision of the Special Committee not to sue merely an advisory one. Indeed, in
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such plenary authority, a court may not grant a corporation's motion to
dismiss.52 In Swenson, the court refused to dismiss a shareholder's ac-
tion. Among other things, the corporation failed to vest in a special com-
mittee the authority to make a binding recommendation. 3 The court
noted that "the litigation evaluation committee was not vested with the
plenary powers of the full board, but was only an advisory group whose
task it was to report to the full board its recommendations as to potential
litigation."
5 4
The language in the following sample resolutions appeared to vest
sufficient authority in special litigation committees:
Sample 1
"[The special litigation committee shall] make and report its
findings and determinations to the board of directors, which
findings and determinations shall be final and not subject to re-
view by the board of directors and in all respects shall be bind-
ing upon this corporation." 55
Sample 2
"[T]here is hereby established an Independent Committee on
Litigation .... [T]he Committee shall.., make the determina-
tion as to whether the Company should comply with such de-
mand or any part thereof."5 6
Sample 3
"[The special litigation committee has all the power and au-
thority of the Board of Directors to investigate and] to deter-
mine the position that the Corporation shall take with respect
to said derivative claims alleged on its behalf."57
Sample 4
"The Committee shall... determine whether or not the Corpo-
ration shall undertake any litigation against any one or more of
the present or former Directors or present or former officers of
the Corporation .... 8
carrying out its investigation and in reaching its conclusions, the Special Committee exercised
the full powers of the Board." Id.
52. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (dis-
missal reversed where corporation failed to delegate to special litigation committee power to
make final decision); Swenson, 39 N.C. App. at 106, 250 S.E.2d at 297-98 (refusal to dismiss
upheld where corporation failed to vest plenary authority in its committee).
53. Swenson, 39 N.C. App. at 106, 250 S.E.2d at 297-98.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Computer & Communications Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d at 371.
56. Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
57. Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
58. Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 511. See also Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp.
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2. Special litigation committee members
Counsel especially employed to help investigate a shareholder's
claims ("special counsel"), 9 a board, or, in most states, even defendant-
directors may select a special litigation committee.' Some statutes dic-
tate how many members must be appointed.6 Even if a statute does not
so mandate, a special litigation committee should have more than one
member; courts apparently are reluctant to dismiss on the recommenda-
tion of a single-member committee.62
Special committee members should have reputations for solving
795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982) (board delegated "full authority... without any right of review by
the full Board"); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (S.D. Iowa
1981) (board vested "full and unconditional authority [to the special committee] to act on [the
board's] behalf"); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (court noted
committee report stated it was final, not subject to review by the Board, and binding on
corporation).
59. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
60. Roberts v. Alabama, 404 So. 2d 629, 631-32 (Ala. 1981); Zapata, 430 A.2d at 786;
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 632, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-28
(1979). Under Iowa law, director-defendants cannot appoint a special litigation committee.
Miller v. Register Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709, 715-16 (Iowa 1983). The Massachu-
setts Supreme Court recently denounced the "blanket rule" prohibiting the use of a "special
litigation committee ... where a majority of the board are [sic] named as defendants." Houle
v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 821, 556 N.E.2d, 51, 57 (1990). The court opined:
There is no need to create a blanket rule prohibiting the use of a special litigation
committee in every case where a majority of the board of directors are [sic] named as
defendants .... Once a special litigation committee is formed, the decision whether
to dismiss is removed from the sphere of the interested directors' control. It is suffi-
ciently removed that the board is not disqualified from choosing the Committee.
Id. A shareholder-defendant who controls a corporation may not be able to appoint a special
committee. Hugh Hefner, who controlled 67% of Playboy Magazine, appointed a one-man
special litigation committee in Pompeo v. Hefner, Nos. 6806, 6872, slip op. at 2 (Del. Ch. Mar.
23, 1983). The court acknowledged, in dicta, that the plaintiff's attack on the committee's
independence may be appropriate. Id. at 3. The challenge was premature because the corpo-
ration had not yet moved to dismiss on the committee's recommendation. Id.; cf. Clark v.
Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-53 (5th Cir. 1980) (seemingly independent
directors disqualified from settling derivative action where shareholder-defendant who could
"strip them" of director, officer, and consulting positions had elected them to board), cert.
denied 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
61. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.243 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990) (two or more
members); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 712(a) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1990) (three members).
Special committee members must be selected from the board of directors. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1983).
62. See, ag., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 1984)
(applying Massachusetts law) (special committee member's "personal interests" and "prior
affiliation with the corporation" prevent corporation from proving his "good faith and disinter-
estedness"); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985) (corporation's motion to dismiss
denied where potential conflicts of interest or divided loyalties raised question of fact on
whether one-man committee could act independently); Houle, 407 Mass. at 823-24, 556
N.E.2d at 58-59 (that committee has only one member does not vitiate committee's qualifica-
tions or work, but is factor in determining whether committee can act independently).
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complicated business problems. If a court believes that a special litiga-
tion committee has made a sophisticated litigation decision, the court is
more likely to dismiss a shareholder's suit. 3 Courts dismissing share-
holder's actions have noted that experienced executives, former judges,
economists, university presidents and senators have served on special
committees."
a. special litigation committee members must not have an interest in a
challenged transaction
Special litigation committee members must not have a personal in-
terest in a challenged transaction .6  A director whose "loyalties" are
"divided" between personal gain and the corporation's best interests, or
who has received, or may receive, "a personal financial benefit from th6
challenged transaction.., not equally shared by the stockholders," has
an interest in the challenged transaction. 6
63. One court remarked that a committee member who was "well versed" in corporate
affairs, "independently wealthy in his own right," and in no way "beholden" to defendants,
was especially qualified. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 512 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d
1184 (Del. 1985).
64. See, eg., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying
Delaware law) ("The committee was composed of... persons holding responsible positions in
government and business"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Abella, 546 F. Supp. at 800
(economist, university president and senator comprised special committee); Genzer, 498 F.
Supp. at 693 (chief executive officer of large company and university professor served as com-
mittee); see also Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F. Supp. 817, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (one committee
member was director of securities company, another was president of oil company, and third
was former governor and university president); Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 510 (committee members
included two chairmen of large corporations); Roberts, 404 So. 2d at 633 (court noted that two
lawyer special committee members not dependent upon corporation for their livelihood);
Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 972 (two corporate chair-
men and university professor comprised committee).
65. See Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d at 727. The court in Control Data Corp. noted that
"[tihe [special litigation] committee was composed of seven. .. 'outside' directors - persons
holding responsible positions in government and business. No committee member had been
named as a defendant, and there is no indication that any member was involved in or had
contemporaneous knowledge of the foreign payments." Id.
Special committee members must be independent from the directors and the corporation.
See infra notes 104-59 and accompanying text. Although courts sometimes interchange the
words "disinterest" and "independence," facts showing independence are different from facts
showing a special litigation committee member has no interest in a challenged transaction.
66. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). The Pogostin court considered when
directors are so interested in a challenged transaction that a shareholder need not demand that
the directors redress an alleged wrong before filing a derivative suit. Id. at 625. Pogostin relied
on Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), where the court addressed a similar issue.
The Aronson and Pogostin tests apply to special litigation committees. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499
A.2d 1184, 1189 (Del. 1985); see, eg., Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 694 (applying Delaware law)
(special committee members not interested where "none had a personal financial stake in the
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(i) do special litigation committee members have an interest in a
challenged transaction because they are board members?
Shareholders often contend that special litigation committee mem-
bers who served on a board when the board effected the challenged trans-
action necessarily have an interest in a challenged transaction, especially
if they voted for it. Merely serving on a board does not make a special
committee member interested.67 Thus, in Kaplan v. Wyatt,6" the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery held, "[the] mere fact that a director was on the
Board at the time of the acts alleged in the complaint does not make that
director interested or dependent so as to infringe on his.. . independent
business judgment of whether to proceed with the litigation."69 To avoid
an appearance of interest a board often appoints to the special committee
directors who joined the board after the corporation made the challenged
transaction.70
(ii) do special litigation committee members have an interest in a
challenged transaction because a shareholder names them as
defendants?
Special litigation committee members do not have an interest in a
challenged transaction just because a plaintiff names them as defendants.
As the court in Aronson v. Lewis71 explained, "the mere threat of per-
sonal liability for approving a questioned transaction, standing alone, is
insufficient to challenge either the independence or disinterestedness of
directors.
72
outcome of the litigation."). Accordingly, a special committee member has no interest in a
challenged transaction merely because the special committee owns stock in the corporation.
67. Kaplan, 499 A.2d at 1189. If board members were interested merely because they
voted for a challenged transaction, the Delaware rule requiring that a shareholder make a pre-
suit demand on a corporation would be meaningless. In a forceful opinion, the Delaware
Supreme Court rejected the notion that approving a challenged transaction necessarily makes a
board member interested:
[A]ny board approval of a challenged transaction [does not] automatically connote
"hostile interest[s]" and "guilty participation" by directors, or some other form of
sterilizing influence upon them. Were that so, the demand requirements of our law
would be meaningless, leaving the clear mandate of Chancery Rule 23.1 [requiring
that a shareholder serve a demand] devoid of its purpose and substance.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
68. 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
69. Id. at 1189.
70. See, eg., Maher v. Zapata, 714 F.2d 436, 446 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Delaware law);
Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980);
Abella, 546 F. Supp. at 800.
71. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
72. Id. at 815. See also In re General Tire & Rubber Co., 726 F.2d 1075, 1084 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) (applying Ohio law, court found naming director in a suit
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If a shareholder could prove a disabling interest merely by naming
directors defendants, procedures permitting early dismissal of share-
holder actions on a special committee's recommendation would be se-
verely restricted. If director-defendants were per se interested, only
directors elected after a challenged transaction could serve on a commit-
tee, and that is contrary to established law. The New York court in
Auerbach v. Bennett73 rejected such a notion, stating, "to disqualify the
entire board would be to render the corporation powerless to make an
effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative
action."'74 To raise an issue of interest, a shareholder's complaint must
charge a committee member with specific misconduct. Nominal defend-
ants may serve on the special committee.7" Mills v. Esmark Inc. 76 distin-
guished nominal from specific charges. The court held that two
does not show director's bad faith); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 177, 240 P.2d
421, 427 (1952) (general allegations of conspiracy, unsupported by facts and made on informa-
tion and belief, will not excuse demand); Dawson v. Dawson, 645 S.W.2d 120, 127 n.8 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982) (naming directors because they are "'under the control and domination'" of a
wrongdoer does not excuse demand). But see Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 64 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying Ohio law, court stated named defendant always has an interest); Control Data
Corp. 603 F.2d at 727 ("where the directors, themselves, are subject to personal liability [they]
cannot be expected to determine impartially whether [the suit] is warranted").
73. 47 N.Y.2d 626, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S,2d 920 (1979).
74. Id. at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. Additionally, inAronson v. Lewis
the Delaware Supreme Court soundly rebuffed such a "bootstrap argument" where a share-
holder advanced it to excuse a pre-suit demand:
Plaintiff's final argument is the incantation that demand is excused because the direc-
tors otherwise would have to sue themselves, thereby placing the conduct of the liti-
gation in hostile hands and preventing its effective prosecution. This bootstrap
argument has been made to and dismissed by other courts. Its acceptance would
effectively abrogate Rule 23.1 [requiring demand] and weaken the managerial power
of directors. Unless facts are alleged with particularity to overcome the presump-
tions of independence and a proper exercise of business judgment, in which case the
directors could not be expected to sue themselves, a bare claim of this sort raises no
legally cognizable issue under Delaware corporate law.
473 A.2d at 818 (citations omitted).
75. See, eg., Anderson, 615 F.2d at 782 (director-defendants may serve on special commit-
tee as long as they did not profit from challenged transaction); Klotz v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 386 F. Supp. 577, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (nominal defendants, against whom plaintiff seeks
no relief, are disinterested). Nominal charges do not excuse a shareholder's pre-suit demand.
Recchion v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 889, 897 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (merely alleg-
ing that directors acquiesced in fraudulent activities without alleging that directors themselves
realized money from the activities does not excuse demand); Grossman v. Johnson, 89 F.R.D.
656, 659 (D. Mass. 1981) (mere approval of alleged unlawful action not sufficient participation
to excuse demand), aff'd, 674 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Findley,
109 Cal. App. 2d at 176-77, 240 P.2d at 427 (general statements on information and belief that
directors knew of conspiracy, actively participated in it, knowingly shielded and actively con-
cealed it by affirmative misrepresentations, insufficient to overcome presumption of indepen-
dence and to excuse demand).
76. 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Il. 1982) (applying Delaware law).
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defendant committee members had no interest in counts in which plain-
tiff did not charge specific wrongdoing." The court noted:
Although [special committee members] were each named
as defendants in this action, neither is alleged to have partici-
pated in the decisions of the Esmark Compensation Committee
or to have received any payment or benefit challenged by plain-
tiffs in this lawsuit. The disinterested independence of [the spe-
cial committee members] is not impaired merely because they
were named as nominal defendants in this case.78
Specific charges made the same defendants interested. Allegations
that special committee members in Mills agreed to an alleged misrepre-
sentation in a proxy statement presented an issue on their interest. That
issue precluded dismissal of the shareholder's claims on the alleged mis-
representation.79 The Mills court continued: "As Esmark directors, [the
special committee members] each participated in the alleged wrongdoing
by approving the alleged misrepresentations .... As a practical matter,
neither [of the special committee members] can be expected to exercise
truly independent judgment in evaluating the propriety of their own deci-
sion to approve the proxy statement."
80
The Mills court permitted plaintiffs to prosecute the claims on
which plaintiffs had charged [the special committee members] with spe-
cific wrongdoing.81 A court may not, however, distinguish between nom-
inal and specific charges if a corporation appoints only one director to a
special litigation committee. In Lewis v. Fuqua,2 the issue of a sole
member's interest83 prevented dismissal of a shareholder's action.84 The
court noted, among other things," that plaintiffs had named the sole
77. Id. at 1283.
78. Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 1284.
80. Id. at 1283-84 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 1284. Generally, mere approval of a challenged transaction does not make spe-
cial committee members interested. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. The Mills
court acknowledged this. 544 F. Supp. at 1284 n.6. Mills may be an anomaly. The Mills court
justified its decision on the specific charge of wrongdoing with evidence that "those who prof-
ited from the section 14 violation" dominated special committee members, and the federal
nature of the alleged securities law violation. Id. But see infra note 297 and accompanying
text.
82. 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985).
83. Id. at 967-68. The court called it an issue of "independence" and a "conflict of interest
or divided loyalt[y]." Id A special committee member must pass two tests, however. First,
the member must have no interest in the challenged transaction, see supra note 65, and second,
must be independent from the board and the corporation. See infra note 104.
84. Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 967.
85. The committee member was a board member when the alleged wrongdoing occurred.
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member a defendant: "the Committee here consisted of but one person
.... Although [he] is well renowned, there are circumstances which
must lead the Court to have questions .... [h]e is one of the defendants
in this suit.' ' s6 A single committee member, the Fuqua court warned,
should, "like Caesar's wife, be above reproach. '8 7 The court rejected the
special committee's recommendation to dismiss and let the shareholder
proceed with the litigation. 8
(ii) do special litigation committee members have an interest in a
challenged transaction because it benefits them?
A shareholder may assert that committee members have an interest
in a challenged transaction because it benefits them. 9 Shareholders, for
example, may accuse committee members of using a challenged transac-
tion to secure their own jobs ("entrenchment") 90 or to control shares that
they do not own.91
Conclusory allegations of entrenchment do not establish that direc-
tors have an interest in a transaction because it permitted them to keep
their jobs.92 A plaintiff must show a "logical or factual nexus between
the challenged transaction and the asserted entrenchment." 93 Such a
Id. at 966. He was politically and financially connected with J.B. Fuqua, Fuqua Industries'
CEO, who allegedly controlled the board. Id. at 966-67. He was President of Duke Univer-
sity, and Fuqua Industries and J.B. Fuqua, a Duke trustee, had made a $10 million pledge to
Duke. Id. at 967.
86. Id. at 966 (emphasis added). The single committee member in Fuqua also served as
one of three special committee members for ITT. See ITT, 466 F. Supp. at 821.
87. Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 967; see also Houle, 407 Mass. at 823-24, 556 N.E.2d at 58-59.
88. Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 972.
89. A director is interested where he or she has received, or may receive, "a personal
financial benefit from the challenged transaction... not equally shared by the stockholders."
Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624.
90. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 1983) (conclusory allegations of
entrenchment do not excuse demand).
93. Id. Thus, a shareholder must specifically plead a "logical or factual nexus" when the
shareholder challenges the board's response to a takeover threat or the board's adoption of an
anti-takeover device. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1071 (Del. Ch.)
("the complaint must allege specific facts which demonstrate that the primary purpose of man-
agement was to retain control"), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d
914, 922-23 (Del. Ch. 1987) (plaintiffs failed to show interest on entrenchment theory because
plaintiffs did not allege directors "believed themselves vulnerable to removal from office by
reason of a takeover" or by any other "specific, concrete threat to ... incumbency"), aff'd, 539
A.2d 180 (Del. 1988). Both Grobow and Moran evaluated whether directors' interest excused a
demand. The same standards apply to special committee members' interests. See generally
Kaplan, 484 A.2d 501.
If courts did not require such specific pleading, demands would be futile where the boards
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nexus may exist if management's "primary purpose" in approving a chal-
lenged transaction was "to retain control."94
If a shareholder pleads the proper nexus between a challenged trans-
action and entrenchment, even outside directors95 may be considered in-
terested. Outside directors have no corporate jobs in which to entrench
themselves, but a corporation usually pays them annual stipends or meet-
ing fees.96 In Grobow v. Perot,97 the court held that "lavish" fees may
entice directors to entrench themselves.9"
(iv) do special litigation committee members have an interest in a
challenged transaction because they believe, before investigating,
that a shareholder's claims have no merit?
A plaintiff may allege that special litigation committee members be-
lieved that a shareholder's suit lacked merit before they investigated.99
Such general allegations that a special litigation committee member is
sympathetic to the challenged transaction, however, do not raise an issue
of interest. The plaintiff must produce "tangible evidence of an untoward
interest ... in the outcome of ... litigation.' ' "° Thus, where a chal-
approved transactions that kept management in control. In Lewis v. Graves, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit warned that this would vitiate the Delaware rule requiring a
pre-suit demand:
If a derivative plaintiff could show self-interest in a transaction by mere conclusory
allegations that the defendant directors approved a business acquisition simply to
secure their own positions, without providing any logical or factual nexus between
the transaction and the asserted entrenchment, the demand requirement of Rule 23.1
would again become virtually meaningless.
701 F.2d at 250.
94. Moran, 490 A.2d at 1071.
95. An outside director is "a] member of a corporate board of directors who is not a
company officer and does not participate in the corporation's day-to-day management."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 994 (5th ed. 1979).
96. Perham, Now It Pays to Be a Director, DuN's REv., Mar. 1981, at 60.
97. 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff'd, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
98. Id. at 923 n.12. The court noted:
The rule that receipt of customary directors' fees does not create a disqualifying in-
terest is one involving the application of a presumption (i.e., the presumption of di-
rector disinterest). It is not an unvarying principle that mechanically applies
irrespective of the circumstances. Conceivably a situation might arise where direc-
tors' compensation, in the form of "directors' fees," becomes so lavish that a mechan-
ical application of the presumption would be totally at variance with reality.
Id.
99. In Stein v. Bailey, the court found the committee disinterested, in part, because mem-
bers had no opinion about the challenged transaction before appointed to the committee. 531
F. Supp. at 694. The court declared that "there is absolutely no evidence that the Committee
members held opinions about these matters prior to their appointment to the Committee." Id.
Thus, some boards appoint to the committee only board members who joined the board after
the challenged transaction. See supra note 70.
100. Watts, 525 F. Supp. at 1328 (emphasis added).
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lenged transaction perpetuates management's control, allegations that a
special committee member's wealth or "understanding of the 'signifi-
cance of family control of businesses'" were held insufficient to show
bias."' Likewise, a court will not deem a special committee member
interested in questionable payments just because the committee member
sat on the board of another corporation when it also made questionable
payments.
10 2
A court may find "tangible evidence" of an interest in the outcome
of litigation where special committee members voted, before the board
appointed them to the committee, that a shareholder's suit had no merit.
In Swenson, the court held that directors had a conflict of interest be-
cause they had voted against a shareholder's suit before a board ap-
pointed them to a special committee.
10 3
b. special litigation committee members must be independent
Special litigation committee members must be independent from a
corporation and its management."°4 Independence and interest are sepa-
rate characteristics. As explained above, special litigation committee
members have an interest in a challenged transaction where they have
benefited or may benefit from it, where their "loyalties" are "divided"
between personal gain and the best interests of the corporation,105 or
where they oppose the shareholder's suit for other personal reasons.
Independence, however, is a matter of influence.10 6 Where director-
defendants, a board, or a corporation influences a special committee's
investigation or recommendation, the special committee members may
not be independent. Thus, to remain independent, a director must use
101. Id.; see also Mills, 544 F. Supp. at 1284 n.8 (defending special litigation committee's
findings does not establish hostility or bias "in the formulation" of report) (emphasis in origi-
nal); Kaplan, 499 A.2d at 1189-90 (Del. 1985) (where corporation's primary business is oil and
petroleum products, allegations that committee member was sympathetic to oil company
CEOs, unsupported by evidence that member's inclinations affected his decisions, were
insufficient).
102. See, eg., IT, 466 F. Supp. at 825 (two committee members who were directors of
corporations that had made questionable payments not interested).
103. Swenson, 39 N.C. App. at 107, 250 S.E.2d at 298. But see Mills, 544 F. Supp. at 1283
n.5 (earlier motion to dismiss for failure to make demand does not show bias; decision to
dismiss action on procedural grounds not prejudgment of its merits).
104. Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 624.
105. Id.; see also supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
106. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. Special committee members are not independent when
a director or the corporation unduly influences the committee's work. "Independence means
that a director's decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before [him or her]
rather than [on] extraneous considerations or influences." Id. Aronson's independence test
applies to special litigation committees. Id.
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"his or her own informed business judgment... without regard for or
succumbing to influences which convert an otherwise valid business deci-
sion into a faithless act."10 7
(i) do special relationships with director-defendants interfere with a
special committee member's independence?
A relationship with a director-defendant does not necessarily im-
pugn a special committee member's independence. 10 For example, a
special committee member may belong to an organization with a direc-
tor-defendant and remain independent. In Rosengarten v. Buckley, 09 a
committee member served with a director-defendant on the board of a
national association. 1 0 This did not raise an issue of independence be-
cause the association's board had over 200 members.11
The Buckley court held that a special committee member may re-
main independent from a director-defendant while running another com-
pany with the director-defendant. 1 2 The court found special committee
member/board member (Mr. McGowan) independent from a director-
defendant (Mr. Wells) even though Wells helped manage McGowan's
company.1 3 Wells even helped set McGowan's salary.114 The Buckley
court found McGowan independent because Wells never met with Mc-
Gowan.1 Wells simply made recommendations to McGowan's
board. 6 Furthermore, the recommendations were made after Wells had
left and six months before McGowan joined Wells' board.1 7 Finally,
other special committee members testified Wells did not influence
McGowan."1
Where a special litigation committee's investigation is inadequate on
its face, a court may be suspicious of special committee members' rela-
tionships with director-defendants. The court may presume that the spe-
107. Id.
108. Id. at 815-16. Mere appointment by a chief executive officer also does not raise an
issue of independence. "That is the usual way a person becomes a corporate director." Id. at
816.
109. 613 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Md. 1985).
110. Id. at 1500.
111. d.
112. Id. at 1500-01. A special committee member can also maintain independence even
though the corporation hired his or her partner as special counsel to the special committee. Id.
at 1501; see also Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 77-3180, slip op. at 15-16 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980).
113. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. at 1500.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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cial committee members are not independent. In Holmstrom v. Coastal
Industries, Inc.,l 9 a special committee could not explain how it decided
that a shareholder's suit should be dismissed. The court held that pres-
sure on special committee members "hand-picked" by the majority direc-
tors may justify "a presumption against independence."' 20 The court
explained:
The problems of peer pressure and group loyalty exist afortiori
where the members of a special litigation committee are not
antagonistic, minority directors, but are carefully selected by
the majority directors for their advice. Far from supporting a
presumption of good faith, the pressures placed upon such a
committee may be so great as to justify a presumption against
independence. 121
(ii) do relationships with a corporation interfere with a special
committee member's independence?
Special committee members with no connection to a corporation
when it made a challenged transaction are likely to be independent.122
Complete disassociation, however, is not necessary. Such a principle
would prevent even outside directors from serving on a special commit-
tee. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected such a rule. 23 The
court in In re General Tire & Rubber Co. 124 reasoned that "a flat rule
which allows only those individuals with absolutely no contact with the
Company to exercise independent business judgment .... would pre-
clude virtually every outside director [from serving on a committee]."'
125
The court in General Tire upheld a lower court's ruling that both a
partner in the corporation's law firm and a corporate consultant were
independent. 126 The lawyer had "provided legal assistance to the Com-
pany as outside counsel.., for many years."' 27 The lower court con-
cluded that this relationship alone was "insufficient to establish bias...
119. 645 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
120. Id. at 987.
121. Id.
122. See, eg., Buckley, 613 F. Supp. at 1494-95 ("none of them... had any connection with
the Company at the time of the transaction"). Thus, a corporation may appoint to a special
committee directors who joined after a board effected a challenged transaction. See supra note
70 and accompanying text.
123. General Tire, 726 F.2d at 1084.
124. 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984).
125. Id. at 1084.
126. Id. at 1083-84.
127. Id. at 1084.
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or control.., by inside management." '128 The appellate court affirmed,
"[t]he district court properly concluded that [the special committee
member's] mere legal association with General Tire does not alone dis-
qualify him from exercising independent business judgment." '129
The consultant had investigated "questionable corporate practices"
for General Tire.1 30 The appellate court agreed with the district court
that he, too, was independent. 13 1 He had not participated in the ques-
tionable practices but only in "the corporation's attempt to scrutinize
those affairs after they had occurred." 132 Furthermore, special counsel
employed to assist the special litigation committee had concluded that
the consultant was "absolutely and totally unassociated" with the events
at issue in the shareholder suit.
1 33
In Genzer v. Cunningham,134 a corporation had previously em-
ployed a special committee member as a consultant. 135 The court found
no issue on this former consultant's independence.' 36 He had completed
his consulting work before the corporation made allegedly questionable
payments, the subject of the shareholder's complaint.' 37 Moreover, spe-
cial committee members had discussed the issue among themselves and
with special counsel and concluded that the consulting work would not
affect the committee member's independence.' 38 Significantly, "plaintiffs
concede[d] that [committee members, including the former consultant
were] 'unquestionably individuals of unique stature and
accomplishment.' "139
To raise an issue that a special committee member lacks indepen-
dence because of relationships with a corporation, a shareholder must
show how the relationships influenced the committee member. The Del-
aware Supreme Court in Kaplan v. Wyatt 1 showed how extensive a
relationship between a committee member and a corporation can be
without implicating the committee member's independence. The Kaplan
committee member owned nine percent of a company that did substan-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
135. Id. at 693.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
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tial business ($100-$226 million/year) with the corporation for whom he
served as special committee member.41 In addition, the special commit-
tee member and the corporation were partners in a limited partner-
ship.142 The corporation had invested millions of dollars in the
partnership, from which it had made $2.5 million.143 Finally, the special
committee member owned nineteen percent of another company that did
business with the corporation."4 These business relationships with the
corporation did not impugn the special committee member's indepen-
dence because plaintiffs failed to show how the relationships influenced
hiM 145
(iii) do relationships with a board or a majority stockholder interfere
with a special committee member's independence?
A general charge that a special committee member has a relation-
ship with a board or a majority stockholder does not raise an issue of
independence.1 46 Specific allegations showing how such a relationship
has influenced a committee member, however, may raise the issue. 147
For example, a general charge that a special committee member
consistently votes with a majority of a board does not establish a lack of
independence.1 48 Such an assertion in Mills failed to raise an issue of fact
regarding special committee members' independence. The Mills board
members customarily resolved disagreements before a formal vote, so al-
most every vote was unanimous. 149 The voting pattern did not establish
bias. 5 Likewise, in Stein v. Bailey, 5 ' a charge that "three members of
the Board cannot impartially assess the actions of their fellow directors,
friends and associates,"' 15 2 did not raise an issue of fact.'5 3 The plaintiffs
produced "absolutely no evidence... to suggest even the appearance of
impropriety.' 5 4
141. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 513.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 517.
146. See, eg., Pompeo, Nos. 6806, 6872, slip op. at 5-6 (no conclusive presumption of influ-
ence where majority stockholder could remove committee member from board).
147. See Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 693-94.
148. Mills, 544 F. Supp. at 1284-85.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1285-86 & n.9.
151. 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
152. Id. at 693.
153. Id. at 694.
154. Id.
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Furthermore, the special committee members in Stein "endeavored
to ensure they would remain unaffected by any potentially improper in-
fluences."1 5 Among other things, the committee's special counsel,
"known... for its high professional standards," declared in an affidavit,
"It]he Independent Committee performed its function without interfer-
ence or influence of any sort by any director, officer, employee or agent of
[the corporation]. ' 156 The court agreed with the corporation that the
special committee was independent.
1 57
Declarations that a special committee is impartial, like that of spe-
cial counsel in Stein, help show independence, especially when made
before a special committee begins its work. In Alford v. Shaw, 5' a pro-
spective special committee member warned that the special committee
would "let the chips fall where they may."159 Thus, the prospective spe-
cial committee member, a former Associate Judge of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, stressed that the committee intended to act indepen-
dently of the board.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 690 n.13. The court in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. quoted similar
testimony and remarked that the special committee repeatedly consulted with its independent
counsel about matters "that might have, or appear to have, any bearing on its members' inde-
pendence." 546 F. Supp. at 800.
157. Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 694.
158. 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986), withdrawn on other grounds, 320 N.C. 465, 358
S.E.2d 323 (1987).
159. Id. at 311, 349 S.E.2d at 54. The prospective special committee member further noted:
Speaking for [the committee], should you decide to elect us to the Board of Directors
and to name us as the members of a Special Investigative Committee, we will accept
the appointment provided that it is clearly understood that in undertaking our duties:
(1) We have no preconceived ideas concerning the merits of any claims which
may have been asserted or may in the future be asserted against All American
Assurance Company or any of its present or former officers or directors;
(2) We will conduct as thorough investigation [sic] as we possibly can make of
all matters pertinent to such claims;
(3) Based on the information developed as a result of our investigation and the
facts as we find them to be, we will make our own independent determination as
to what actions, if any, should be undertaken with respect to these claims in the
best interest of all shareholders of All American Assurance Company; and
(4) If after our investigation we determine, in our independent judgment, that
some legal action or actions should, to protect the best interest of all sharehold-
ers, be undertaken against any person or entity, we will see that such actions are
initiated and prosecuted vigorously to a conclusion.
In short, we want it clearly understood that in carrying out our duties as members of
the Board of Directors and as members of the Special Investigative Committee, we
intend to exercise our own independent judgments and to let the chips fall where they
may.
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C. Appointing Special Counsel
A corporation should hire "special counsel" to advise and assist a
special committee."6 Courts satisfied with a special committee's investi-
gation often remark that qualified special counsel guided the special com-
mittee. In Rosengarten v. Buckley, 16 1 where shareholders complained
about entrenchment, the court noted that special counsel was a law
school dean, an American Bar Association committee chairman and a
securities and corporate law expert.162 In Alford v. Shaw, 63 a former
president of the North Carolina Bar Association, "learned" in corporate,
insurance and litigation matters, helped the special committee investigate
claims that the board committed fraud.' 6  The lawyer, especially exper-
ienced as special counsel, had never represented the corporation or any
of its afliates.1
65
D. Committee Work
1. The investigation
A special litigation committee investigates a shareholder's claims. A
special committee must determine whether a shareholder's allegations
have merit and whether a shareholder is likely to prevail.166 Where "se-
rious questions exist" whether a complaint states a cause of action, a
160. See generally Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Md. 1985); Abella v.
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp.
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.l$. Iowa
1981).
161. 613 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Md. 1985).
162. Id. at 1495. The court dismissed the shareholder's complaint on the special commit-
tee's recommendation. Id. at 1504.
163. 318 N.C. 289, 349 S.E.2d 41 (1986), withdrawn on other grounds, 320 N.C. 465, 358
S.E.2d 323 (1987).
164. Id. at 310, 349 S.E.2d at 54.
165. Id. Others who have served as special counsel include professors and former judges.
See, eg., Watts, 525 F. Supp. at 1315; Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs., 443 F. Supp. 516 (E.D.
Pa. 1977), aff'd 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Gall v. Exxon
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
In Stein v. Bailey, the corporation hired a law firm which, the court noted, had never
acted as counsel to the corporation or to any of the special committee members and was
"known in [the] legal community for its high professional standards." 531 F. Supp. 684, 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The relevant prior relationship is between the corporation and special coun-
sel. Id. at 687. In Kaplan v. Wyatt, a law firm that had no relationship with the corporation
but had suffered a $50 million judgment at the hands of the shareholder-plaintiff's attorneys
was not biased. 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985); see also
Genzer v. Cunningham 498 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (special counsel had no prior
dealings with the corporation or its directors).
166. See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 507-08 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184
(Del. 1985).
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court will likely dismiss on a special litigation committee's recommenda-
tion.167 Similarly, courts dismiss where a challenged transaction
achieved proper corporate goals and did not waste corporate assets168 or
where a shareholder's action is unnecessary to "police" the board.16 9
Even if a special committee concludes that a shareholder's claims have
merit and a shareholder is likely to prevail, the special committee may
recommend dismissal where litigation will cost more than a corporation
would gain.
1 70
Special litigation committees often conclude that shareholders'
claims have no merit or that litigating would cost more than it would
benefit a corporation. A special committee presents its conclusions and
supporting analysis in a thorough, comprehensive, and detailed report.171
The report should support a recommendation to dismiss with "persua-
sive factors" and "valid legal analysis."' 172 If a special committee
presents flawed legal analysis, a court may permit a shareholder's action
to proceed.1
73
167. See id. at 520-21.
168. Rosengarten v. ITT, 466 F. Supp. 817, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (shareholder's complaint
dismissed because alleged improper corporate payments were made in furtherance of legiti-
mate business objectives).
169. Id.; see also Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendants
not involved in any wrongdoing and did not personally profit from their actions; allegedly
wrongful activities were customary business practices that served corporation's interest), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
170. The committee should consider "ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations,
employee relations, fiscal as well as legal" factors. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982); see, ag., Stein v.
Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (cost of litigation-its effect on morale, disrup-
tion of management, and concomitant loss of business - far outweighed any benefit litigation
could possibly produce; wrongdoers had already been sanctioned; corporation had already
changed its procedures).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may permit a special litigation committee to
consider, in, certain circumstances, only the out-of-pocket cost of litigation. In Joy v. North,
the court, applying Connecticut law, held that a special litigation committee may consider
attorney's fees, out-of-pocket litigation expenses, and time corporate employees would spend
preparing for and participating at trial. 692 F.2d 880, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1051 (1983). Costs of indemnifying directors or others for liability from derivative suits
also should be considered. Id. at 892. Indirect costs count only where the amount the corpo-
ration may recover (likely damages discounted by probability of success) is insubstantial rela-
tive to shareholder equity. Id. Indirect costs include the distraction of key employees and lost
profits from the publicity of a trial. Id. at 892-93. Other indirect costs, such as "a negative
impact on morale and upon the corporate image," may not be included. Id. at 892.
171. The committee should present a thorough written record of the committee's work,
including its investigation, findings, and recommendation. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981); Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 506. The corporation may not keep its report
confidential. See infra notes 250-64 and accompanying text.
172. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
173. Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985).
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Most courts, however, do not second guess a special committee's
conclusion as long as the special committee conducted a reasonable good
faith investigation and has a reasonable basis for recommending that the
corporation move to dismiss.174 Courts do not expect a perfect investiga-
tion or report. Courts have criticized, but nevertheless found reasonable,
investigations done in good faith.
For example, the court in Kaplan v. Wyatt 17 1 criticized an investiga-
tion but dismissed a shareholder's suit on a special committee's recom-
mendation.1 76  Among other things, special counsel had destroyed
original notes of interviews with witnesses to the challenged transac-
tion. 177 In addition, the special committee failed to pursue a rumor that
a defendant was prepared "to flee [the] country." 178 The special commit-
tee also ignored an acknowledged wrongdoing, 179 failed to investigate ad-
equately a certain allegedly improper oil trading transaction, 180 and
failed to investigate a related party transaction involving the sale and
leaseback of a vessel.'81 The special committee's report suggested that
special counsel had personally interviewed a witness when counsel had
not done so.18" Finally, the report showed that special counsel, hired to
assist the special committee, conducted virtually the entire investiga-
tion.'83 The court nevertheless found the investigation reasonable and
accepted the report's recommendations because the special committee
did its work in good faith.
The report in Rosengarten v. ITT 184 was even skimpier than the re-
port in Kaplan v. Wyatt.'8 The ITT report "noticeably" lacked detail of
174. Of course, the special committee must have no interest in the challenged transaction
and be independent from the board, director-defendants, and the corporation. See supra notes
65-159 and accompanying text.
In addition, certain courts may take a "second step" and apply their own business judg-
ment to dismissing the shareholder's suit. See, eg., Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune,
525 F. Supp. 1311, 1326 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 824-25, 556 N.E.2d
51, 59 (1990). Such a court can reevaluate the committee's conclusion even if the committee
conducted a reasonable investigation and has a reasonable basis for recommending that the
corporation move to dismiss. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
175. 484 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 499 A.2d 1184 (Del. 1985).
176. Id. at 519.
177. Id. at 514.
178. Id. at 515.
179. Id. The plaintiff accused the committee of "sweep[ing] the matter [of double-billing]
under the rug." Id.
180. Id. at 516.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 502-03.
183. Id. at 503.
184. 466 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
185. Id. at 825-26; see also Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 511.
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the wrongdoing, "skip[ped] somewhat over the ... negligence of one
director," and failed to quantify certain questionable payments. 186 De-
spite the criticism, the court held that the investigation was
reasonable. 
187
Discrepancies between draft and final reports did not taint the
Rosengarten v. Buckley 88 investigation, for the differences were insignifi-
cant or explained.' 89 In addition, neither the failure to record committee
meetings stenographically (minutes were good enough), nor the failure to
interview certain witnesses, made the investigation unreasonable. 90
Notwithstanding such judicial deference, a plaintiff may successfully
attack an investigation where committee members are unfamiliar with or
cannot explain their conclusions. In Holmstrom v. Coastal Industries,
Inc.,191 each committee member "steadfastly believe(d) that the action
should be dismissed."' 92 Each had trouble, however, explaining why the
challenged transaction had no "disabling taint." 193 No committee mem-
ber could articulate how the committee decided to recommend dismissal
"given the taint issue."' 94 The court ruled that issues of fact on the "in-
dependence and the thoroughness of the [committee's] work" precluded
dismissal. 9
In sum, to raise a triable issue that an investigation is unreasonable,
a shareholder must prove that it is "'so restricted in scope, so shallow in
execution, or otherwise so pro forma or half-hearted as to constitute a
pretext or sham.' ",196 Thus, shareholders may attack the length and the
scope of an investigation. Shareholders may also complain about who
conducted the investigation - special committee members, special coun-
sel, plaintiff or director-defendants.
a. how long should a special committee investigate?
A special litigation committee should investigate a challenged trans-
action for as long as necessary to be thorough. "[I]nvestigative methods
186. IT, 466 F. Supp. at 825-26.
187. Id. at 826.
188. 613 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Md. 1985).
189. Id. at 1502.
190. Id. at 1502-03.
191. 645 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
192. Id. at 988.
193. Id.
194. Id. The court also noted that a director-defendant had appointed the committee mem-
bers, who moved to dismiss a "brief six day[s]" after issuing their report. Id:
195. Id.
196. Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 695. In some states the corporation bears the burden of proving
that the investigation is reasonable. See supra note 36..
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must always turn on the nature and characteristics of the particular sub-
ject being investigated." '197
In Stein v. Bailey,198 the shareholder alleged that the corporation
failed to disclose "secret, unauthorized, and illegal payments [for] busi-
ness and special political favors." 199 The shareholder also alleged that
the corporation paid an "exorbitant" price for the shares of a company
that the corporation merged with a subsidiary.2" The special committee
reached a tentative conclusion after meeting only twice and investigating
these claims for only seven weeks.201 The Stein court found the investi-
gation reasonable.2 °2
Courts have also found the following investigations reasonably thor-
ough: The special committee in In re Continental Illinois Securities Liti-
gation 203 deliberated about losses resulting from the demise of the Penn
Square Bank for two and one-half months.2°4 The special committee in
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado2 o0 investigated alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty for three months.20 6 The ITT committee met sixteen times over a
year,2 07 and the Buckley committee met regularly over five months to
investigate the opposition to a takeover attempt.20 8
b. how broad should an investigation be?
A broad investigation appears thorough. Courts accepting special
committees' recommendations to dismiss often comment on the number
of witnesses interviewed. For example, one special committee that con-
sidered claims that a CEO misused a corporation interviewed 140 wit-
nesses "throughout the world. ' 20 9 The court found the investigation
reasonable. 210
197. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y. 2d 619, 636, 393 N.E.2d 994, 995, 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 930 (1979). The committee need not always meet face-to-face but can confer by tele-
phone. Watts, 525 F. Supp. at 1328.
198. 531 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
199. Id. at 686 n.3.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 685-87, 694.
202. Id. at 693.
203. 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984).
204. Id. at 1304.
205. 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
206. Id. at 781.
207. I7, 466 F. Supp. at 824.
208. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. at 1493-95.
209. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 511.
210. Id. at 519-20. Compare with Stein, where a special committee made a "tentative"
determination after interviewing only two witnesses. 531 F. Supp. at 694. The Stein court
found the investigation reasonable. Id.
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Regardless of the number of witnesses it interviews, a special
committee that fails to interview important witnesses does not conduct a
reasonable good faith investigation. In Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Inves-
tors,2 11 a special committee failed to interview two companies from
which the corporation bought its own stock to avert a takeover.212 The
shareholder claimed that the transactions wasted corporate assets, had
no corporate purpose, and entrenched management.2 13 The two compa-
nies, the court held, "could have provided crucial evidence of the pur-
pose of that challenged transaction and the value of the [corporation's]
transferred assets."' 214 The court reversed a lower court that had granted
the corporation's motion to dismiss.
How a special committee conducts interviews does not seem to mat-
ter. Interviews may be in person,21 5 by telephone or questionnaire,216 or
by interrogatory.217 Testimony need not be under oath; a plaintiff need
not cross-examine witnesses.21 8
Corporation counsel generally should not attend interviews of cor-
porate employees. Corporate counsel represents a corporation, whose in-
terests and objectives may not be the same as a special committee's. In
Kaplan, however, the court upheld an investigation even though the cor-
poration arranged, and corporate counsel attended, interviews of corpo-
rate employees.2" 9 The Kaplan court warned that, although "not fatal,"
corporate counsel's assistance is "not recommended.
' 220
Courts also may infer that an investigation is thorough from the
number and type of documents that a special committee examines.
Reviewing every deposition taken, examining documents of the company
and its attorneys, reviewing all pleadings, and studying "reams and
reams" of paper supplied by counsel help show thorough
211. 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984).
212. Id. at 379.
213. Id. at 373.
214. Id.
215. Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930 (special com-
mittee met personally with defendants, but sent written questionnaires to non-management
directors).
216. In re General Tire & Rubber Co., 726 F.2d 1075, 1085 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
858 (1984) (committee interviewed some witnesses by questionnaire and others by telephone).
217. Afford v. Shaw, 318 N.C. 289, 313, 349 S.E.2d 41, 55 (1986), withdrawn on other
grounds, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
218. Id. But see Joy, 692 F.2d at 892 (weight given certain evidence affected by whether
testimony subject to cross-examination). Presumably, the special committee can permit a
plaintiff to examine a witness.
219. Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1190 (Del. 1985).
220. Id.
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investigation.221
c. how much should a special litigation committee rely
on special counsel?
A special committee need not investigate every detail itself.222 A
special committee may delegate tasks to special counsel. Special counsel
may merely advise or assist a special committee or may conduct much of
an investigation.223
In ITT, special counsel set standards for reviewing the challenged
transaction, conducted all fact-finding, reviewed 10,000 documents, in-
terviewed forty witnesses, gave legal advice and prepared the special
committee's final report.224 The court held that the special committee
could rely extensively on special counsel:
221. See, eg., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1983) (reviewed all pleadings);
Buckley, 613 F. Supp. at 1495 (examined documents of company and its attorneys); ITT, 466
F. Supp. at 824 (studied reams of paper supplied by counsel).
222. Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 694.
223. One court announced that a diligent special litigation committee is one which is famil-
iar with counsel's report, asks searching and probing questions, and prepares a recommenda-
tion articulating its conclusions. The committee relied "on its staff" no more than "many busy
public officials, including legislators, agency heads and even members of the judiciary." 1TT,
466 F. Supp. at 824-25.
In Continental Illinois, special counsel interviewed eighty witnesses, researched applicable
law, and advised whether an insurance policy covered any potential liability. 732 F.2d at 1305.
In Stein, the special committee retained special counsel for the following tasks:
(1) advise the Committee on the appropriate manner in which it should proceed; (2)
conduct legal research and prepare memoranda for the Committee on the merits of
the claims stated in plaintiffs' demand letter; (3) assist the Committee in fact-finding
... (4) arrange... for the Committee to interview relevant witnesses and obtain and
analyze pertinent documentary evidence; and (5) prepare a report to embody the
conclusions reached by the Committee.
Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 687.
In Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., counsel gathered and reviewed documents, con-
ducted interviews, and prepared 160 investigative reports and seven memoranda, while the
special committee met ten times only to consider and discuss the materials submitted by coun-
sel. 546 F. Supp. 795, 800-01 (E.D. Va. 1982).
In Buckley, special committee members did not attend every interview; counsel conducted
some alone. Interview summaries, the court held, are good enough, especially where the spe-
cial committee could reinterview any witness interviewed by counsel alone. 613 F. Supp. at
1503.
In Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, the special committee met only four times
(though its members conferred frequently by phone). 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1328 (S.D. Iowa
1981). The committee relied extensively on special counsel. Id. The investigation was never-
theless sufficient because committee members reviewed every deposition and many corporate
documents, interviewed seven defendants, consulted with the attorneys for plaintiff and de-
fendants, and compiled the report. Id. The committee conducted a reasonable good faith
investigation even though one member could not understand the report and could not remem-
ber how much the committee spent on legal fees. Id.
224. 7T, 466 F. Supp. at 824.
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[T]he Committee's reliance on its staff was not unreasonable in
extent and, in fact, was no greater than that of many busy pub-
lic officials, including legislators, agency heads and even mem-
bers of the judiciary. The Committee appears to have
supervised those aspects of the investigation in which it was not
involved personally and was responsible for the conclusions set
out in the report. Moreover, it was entirely proper, indeed de-
sirable, for the Committee to rely on counsel for legal advice.22
The 1TT special committee, however, also actively investigated the
challenged transaction.226 The court quoted one committee member,
who described the special committee's extensive work on a draft report:
"[W]e took the first draft, which was not in the form of a re-
port, but purely in the form of a draft, added our own recollec-
tions to it, changed it where we thought it ought to be changed,
asked [counsel] to work it over again, so that I would say that
word for word, I participated in every word in this report." '2 27
Thus, despite special counsel's dominant role, the court described the
special committee's work as "impressively thorough." '228
Special counsel, after investigating a shareholder's claims, may rec-
ommend that a corporation pursue a cause of action. If a special com-
mittee ignores this advice, a court may deny a corporation's motion to
dismiss and order that a plaintiff have further discovery.
In Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune,229 special counsel con-
cluded that litigating would best serve the corporation's interests.230 The
special committee rejected this advice and sought dismissal.231 Because
the special committee could not explain or otherwise support its decision
to ignore special counsel, the court denied the corporation's motion to
dismiss.232 Although satisfied with the special committee's independence
and good faith, the court ordered further discovery on why the special
225. Id. at 825.
226. Id. at 824.
227. Id. at 825 (quoting deposition transcript).
228. Id. at 824.
The Committee, which met sixteen times during the course of its year-long investiga-
tion, determined the scope of the review... studied reams and reams of documents
supplied by counsel... personally interviewed all but one of the defendants and
received oral summaries from counsel of the interviews during which a Committee
member was not present... and closely supervised the preparation of the report.
Id.
229. 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
230. Id. at 1329.
231. Id. at 1315.
232. Id. at 1329 (rejecting the advice raised "question[s] as to the premise for the commit-
tee's recommendation that dismissal of [one count] was appropriate").
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committee ignored special counsel's advice.233
d. can a special litigation committee use the corporation's
research or consultants?
(i) corporate research
As long as a special committee does not "blindly rely" on it, a spe-
cial committee need not redo the corporation's research on a challenged
transaction.234 For example, in Stein, a special committee used a corpo-
rate audit committee's report.235 The court held that the special commit-
tee need not "redo" the audit committee's report because it was
"comprehensive. ' 236 In Genzer v. Cunningham,237 a special committee
relied on a corporate "Business Practices Committee's report" of ques-
tionable payments. The report presented an investigation made by the
corporation's accountant (a defendant) and the corporation's counsel.238
The shareholder's derivative complaint alleged that the directors violated
the Securities Exchange Act, among other laws, when they approved the
payments. The court held that the special litigation committee could rely
on the report because the special committee had "looked into [the ac-
countant's] participation" with "extra care" to assure that it was thor-
ough and objective.239
(ii) corporate consultants
In Buckley, a shareholder criticized a special committee for using
the corporation's financial advisors instead of hiring an independent con-
sultant.2' The court held that, because the corporation's investment
bankers were "firms with national reputations," their participation did
not taint the investigation.241 Furthermore, accounting, on which the
233. Id. at 1327. The court permitted plaintiffs to depose committee members about why
they urged dismissal. Id. The court, however, circumscribed the discovery. Id. at 1329.
Plaintiffs could ask about the factors that affected the decision, but not why the committee
members considered such factors. Id.
234. Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 694-95. The Continental Illinois court permitted the special
committee to review "summaries of interviews conducted earlier by [corporate] counsel in
[prior] litigation." Continental IlL, 732 F.2d at 1304-05.
235. Stein, 531 F. Supp. at 694.
236. Id. Presumably, a special committee must redo an incomplete report.
237. 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
238. Id. at 684.
239. Id. at 696.
240. Buckley, 613 F. Supp. at 1503.
241. Id. The shareholders in Buckley also complained that defendants purged corporate
files of certain documents before permitting the special committee to review them. Id. The
court found that excising "extraneous materials relating to other clients of [corporate coun -
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investment bankers gave advice, was an insubstantial issue.242
e. must special litigation committee members do equal work?
Special litigation committee members need not do equal work. In
ITT, one special committee member spent "far less time" on an investi-
gation than two other committee members. His "grasp of the issues was
less thorough" than that of other committee members.243 Because the
less active committee member was "familiar with the substance of the
findings and participated in formulating the Committee's conclusions,"
however, the unbalanced division of work did not matter.244 The court
held that the investigation would have been valid even if two, rather than
three, special committee members had done it.245
f may a shareholder-plaintiff participate in an investigation?
A shareholder-plaintiff has no right to participate in a special litiga-
tion committee's investigation even though,, as a litigant, it can invoke
the subpoena power of a court.2 46 A shareholder-plaintiff cannot tell the
special committee how to do its work.247
Moreover, a shareholder cannot even challenge a special commit-
tee's qualifications until a board has considered the special committee's
report.248 Once appointed, a special litigation committee "should be af-
sel]" before the committee investigated did not make the committee's work "inherently biased
or inadequate." Id.
242. Id.
243. IT, 466 F. Supp. at 825.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. A shareholder plaintiff, as a party to a lawsuit, can issue subpoenas requiring non-
party witnesses to appear for depositions and to produce documents under court order. See,
e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a), 45. This subpoena power does not give a shareholder plaintiff a
right to participate in a special litigation committee's work. Pompeo v. Hefner, Nos. 6806,
6872, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1983).
A special litigation committee may invite a plaintiff to help the committee assess plain-
tiff's claims. In Alford v. Shaw, the court noted with approval "plaintiffs' counsel.., was
afforded every opportunity to provide the Committee with information which might have been
helpful in assessing the merits of the claims." 318 N.C. 289, 313, 349 S.E.2d 41, 55 (1986),
withdrawn on other grounds, 320 N.C. 465, 358 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
247. "The derivative plaintiff should not be permitted to intermeddle." Pompeo, Nos. 6806,
6872, slip op. at 7. In Rosengarten v. Buckley, the special committee recommended dismissal
before it interviewed plaintiff's counsel. 613 F. Supp. 1493, 1501 (D.C. Md. 1985). The court
rebuffed plaintiff's contention that the investigation was incomplete. Id. at 1502. The special
committee, the court opined, can draw tentative conclusions. "Indeed," the court remarked,
"the absence of such a tentative conclusion would, in the court's mind raise more suspicion."
Id.
248. See, e.g., Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421, 423 (Del. 1983); Pompeo, Nos. 6806,
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forded a reasonable time to carry out its function. '249
g. must a special litigation committee disclose its report to the public?
Courts generally do not permit special litigation committees to keep
their reports confidential. In Kaplan v. Wyatt,250 a special committee
sought to protect an exhibit to its report.251 The special committee be-
lieved that the exhibit contained false information that would damage the
corporation if released to the public. 25 2 The special committee also
sought to protect names of fifteen current or former corporate employees
whom the special committee had interviewed. 2 3 The fifteen witnesses
spoke with special committee members only after the special committee
promised that it would apply for the protective order.25 4 The court nev-
ertheless refused to keep the exhibit and the names confidential.2 5
The Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit in Continental Illinois
also declined to seal a special committee's report that the corporation
contended would damage the corporation.25 6 The court released the re-
port to two national newspapers because the corporation had used it in
open court.25 7 The court had relied upon it, and, in a public courtroom,
witnesses referred to it and counsel quoted from it.258 The court held that
where a committee uses a report "in an adjudicative procedure to ad-
vance the corporate interest, there is a strong presumption that confiden-
tiality must be surrendered.
'2 9
6872, slip op. at 3 (shareholder could not challenge independence of one-man committee ap-
pointed by 67% shareholder until corporation moved to dismiss on committee's
recommendation).
249. Abbey v. Computer & Communications Tech. Corp., 457 A.2d 368, 375 (Del. Ch.
1983).
250. No. 6361, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 23, 1983).
251. Id. at 2.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 7. But see Byers v. Baxter, 69 A.D.2d 343, 349, 419 N.Y.S.2d 497, 501-02 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979) (report may be protected (dictum)); Weiland v. Central & S.W. Corp., No.
9769 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (court denied plaintiff's request
that special committee produce its report). In appropriate circumstances, a court may give
limited protection to sensitive material. See, eg., DEL. CH. R. 5(g).
256. Continental Il1, 732 F.2d at 1309.
257. Id. at 1304.
258. Id. at 1304-05.
259. Id. at 1315. The court stated that the material was not as damaging as the corporation
claimed: "very little of the Report [is] ... materially damaging to Continental." Id. at 1315
n.21. The court also remarked that Continental could have proposed to edit particularly sensi-
tive portions of the report rather than request that the court seal the entire document. Id.
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Likewise, in Joy v. North,2" the Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit held that a special litigation committee "must disclose to the
court and the parties not only [a] report but also all underlying data." '261
A motion for judgment based on a report waives any attorney-client priv-
ilege.262 Moreover, if special counsel's working papers are "communi-
cated" to a special committee, a corporation may not claim work product
protection.263 The court opined, "confidence in the administration of
justice would be severely weakened" if "special litigation committees
were routinely allowed to do their work in the dark of night.
' 261
2. Plaintiff's discovery
A court stays plaintiff's discovery for a reasonable time while a spe-
cial litigation committee investigates and writes its report.265 Under Del-
aware law, "it is a foregone conclusion that such a stay must be
granted. '2 66 The court decides how long the discovery stay should last,
260. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
261. Id. at 893.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 893-94.
264. Id.
265. See, eg., Grafman v. Century Broadcasting Corp., No. 89 C 5372 (N.D. Ill. July 3,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (discovery stayed pending report). The plaintiff can-
not conduct discovery before the special committee makes its report, but the corporation can-
not have a decision on a summary judgment motion until the plaintiff has completed discovery.
See, e-g., 1T, 466 F. Supp. at 823 (summary judgment motion postponed pending depositions
of committee members); Pompeo, Nos. 6806, 6872, slip op. at 7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1983).
The court also must conduct a hearing. See, eg., De Moya v. Fernandez, 559 So. 2d 644,
645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (summary judgment reversed where lower court had conducted
no hearing on "bias, conflict of interest, objectivity and reasonableness in the preparation and
presentation of the report"); Rosen v. Bernard, 108 A.D.2d 906, 909, 485 N.Y.S.2d 791, 793
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (court may not deny corporation's motion to dismiss without hearing
on special committee's independence and investigation). During such a hearing, however,
courts that do not follow Zapata may not make even a limited review of the merits. See, e.g.,
Will v. Engebretson & Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1033, 1043, 261 Cal. Rptr. 868, 874 (1989)
(dismissal of shareholder's action reversed where lower court conducted limited review of
merits).
266. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 510; see, eg., Stotland, 469 A.2d at 421, 423. Such a stay is not a
"foregone conclusion" under Minnesota law. In International Broadcasting Corp. v. Turner,
the Minnesota court refused to stay plaintiff's discovery while the special committee investi-
gated. 734 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Minn. 1990). The court permitted plaintiff to perform dis-
covery while the special committee investigated because the court determined that the
committee members were not disinterested and independent. Plaintiff named two of three
defendants, and a shareholder who had obtained stock in the challenged transaction designated
the third. Id.
See also Grafman, No. 89-C-5372, at *4 (court implied that plaintiff may have discovery
while committee investigates). In dicta, the court stated that the court will decide how long the
investigation should take, what discovery plaintiff should have in the interim, and whether
discovery would interfere with the committee's investigation. Id.
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dependent "upon the particular facts and circumstances of [each]
case."
267
When it lifts a stay, a court may permit a shareholder to conduct
limited discovery on selected issues: a special committee's independence,
disinterest, investigation and report. 68 If shareholders fail to limit -heir
discovery requests to these subjects, courts may deny all discovery.269
A court not only decides how long discovery should last,270 but also
how much discovery a plaintiff shall have and how a plaintiff shall con-
duct it. "[T]he type and extent of any discovery.., is... left to the...
Court .... ,,271 Thus, a court may limit discovery to depositions of spe-
cial committee members concerning their investigation and to documents
that they used.272
267. Computer & Communications Tech., 457 A.2d at 376. The court must balance the
committee's need to investigate with the plaintiff's need to prosecute. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at
511-12 (plaintiff's discovery delayed for two years); Pompeo, Nos. 6806, 6872, slip op. at 7-8
(where special committee had to review over 500 exhibits and testimony from more than 170
witnesses, action stayed for five months).
268. "D]iscovery is nol by right, but by order of the Court. .. ." Kaplan, 499 A.2d at
1192. Valid subjects for such limited discovery are "what the Committee did or did not do,
and the actual existence of the documents and persons purportedly examined by it . .. ."
Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 519. Accordingly, where the committee investigated activities of corpo-
rate officials not named defendants, plaintiff may have discovery on them.
269. See, e.g., Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. at 1246 (failure to challenge independence
of litigation committee may lead to summary dismissal without discovery on any issue);
Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930 (where plaintiff
raises no question about independence of committee or adequacy of its investigation, court
may dismiss without discovery); Auerbach v. Aldrich, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 1977, at 13, col. 6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 21, 1977)(shareholder who does not question independence of the review-
ing committee also may lose the right to discovery).
Where shareholders demand that the board redress the injuries that are the subject of
their complaint, the shareholders concede that the board (and thus a special litigation commit-
tee of board members) is independent. Under these circumstances, the shareholder may only
have discovery on the special committee's investigation, not on the independence or interest of
the committee. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990).
270. In Gall, where the committee investigated claims that the Exxon Corporation made
$59 million of questionable payments to the Italian government over 11 years, the court gave
plaintiff 60 days to conduct discovery. Gall, 418 F. Supp. at 509, 520. In Byers, where the
shareholders complained that the corporation irresponsibly discharged toxic waste, the court
gave the shareholders four months to do discovery. Byers, 69 A.D.2d at 349, 419 N.Y.S.2d at
501. The court apparently believed that four months was long but necessary because "with the
summer season coming on, it may be difficult to get lawyers and witnesses together." Id.
271. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 507.
272. Id. at 519. Plaintiff may (1) depose committee members concerning their good faith
and whether their conclusions are reasonable and (2) request documents about the nomination
of committee members and their business affiliations. Id. Plaintiff may not request all docu-
ments that the committee reviewed and upon which it relied pending the completion of the
committee's investigation and issuance of its report. Computer & Communications Tech., 457
A.2d at 375.
The plaintiff can discover facts that the committee considered, but not the committee's
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A court will drastically restrict discovery where a plaintiff fails to
plead specific wrongdoing. The Delaware court in Kaplan limited docu-
ment production to a special committee member's nomination and the
business organizations to which the member belonged.273 The court held
that other documents that the special committee reviewed were immate-
rial because plaintiff had charged director-defendants with general, not
specific, wrongdoing.274
E. Motions to Dismiss Denied
In sum, courts do deny motions to dismiss that corporations bring
on the recommendations of their special litigation committees. Summa-
ries of such cases follow:
1. Connecticut: Joy v. North275
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying Connecticut
law, reversed a lower court's decision dismissing a shareholder's deriva-
tive suit on the recommendation of a special litigation committee.2 76 Us-
ing its own business judgment, the appellate court determined that
"plaintiff's chances of success [were] rather high. '2 77 The shareholder
claimed that the officers and directors of a bank negligently loaned mil-
lions of dollars to a construction company.278 The court disagreed with a
special litigation committee's conclusion "that only a 'possibility of a
finding of negligence' exists"2 79 and concluded that the shareholder's suit
probably would bring a "substantial net return."
280
2. Delaware: Lewis v. Fuqua
21
1
The Delaware Court of Chancery denied a corporation's motion to
dismiss a shareholder's suit.28 2 Questions of fact existed on a special liti-
reasons for considering those facts. Watts, 525 F. Supp. at 1330. Nor can the plaintiff get
discovery on the committee's decision not to consider other facts or to pursue other avenues of
inquiry. Id. at 1329-30; see also Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975),
rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978) (discovery granted on independence of committee mem-
bers), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
273. Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 507.
274. Id. at 521.
275. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
276. Id. at 882-83.
277. Id. at 896.
278. Id. at 882-83.
279. Id. at 896.
280. Id. at 897.
281. 502 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1985).
282. Id. at 964.
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gation committee's interest and independence." 3 The special committee
also failed to show a reasonable basis for concluding that the corporation
should not pursue the shareholder's claims.284
The shareholder claimed that directors had usurped a corporate op-
portunity when they purchased stock of a company that the corporation
had considered purchasing.28 ' The stock would have given the corpora-
tion a tax loss to shelter future earnings.2 6
The board appointed a one-man special litigation committee.287 The
court found that issues of fact existed on both his interest in the chal-
lenged transaction and his independence from the board.288 He sat on
the board when the directors purchased the stock; he had had many
"political and financial dealings with.., the chief executive officer"; and
the shareholder had named him a defendant.28 9
In dicta, the court also opined that the corporation "ha[d] not borne
its burden of establishing a reasonable basis for [the committee's] conclu-
sions.1290 The special committee had concluded that the opportunity to
purchase the stock was a personal opportunity, not a corporate opportu-
nity.291 The court found this conclusion "flawed" because it was con-
trary to Delaware law and thus had no "reasonable basis.
292
3. Illinois: Mills v. Esmark Inc. 293
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, applying Delaware law, denied a corporation's motion to dismiss.
The shareholders claimed that the corporation violated section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making an alleged misrepresentation
in a proxy statement.294 Board members who sat on the special litigation
committee had approved (he alleged misrepresentation. 295 The court
held that the special litigation committee members could not "be ex-
pected to exercise truly independent judgment in evaluating the propriety
283. Id. at 966-67.
284. Id. at 967-68.
285. Id. at 965.
286. Id. at 964.
287. Id. at 965.
288. Id. at 966-67.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 967.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. III. 1982).
294. Id. at 1293-96; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988).
295. Mills, 544 F. Supp. at 1283-84.
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of their own decision to approve the proxy statement. '296 The court
noted that section 14 claims must be "saved" from "premature death.
'297
Federal policy, the court held, prevented summary dismissal.2 98
The shareholder also claimed that directors violated their fiduciary
duties when they granted certain shares of common stock to key employ-
ees. The court denied the corporation's motion to dismiss this claim be-
cause the special litigation committee's report lacked "factual detail and
legal analysis" of the claim.2 99
4. Massachusetts: Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors"°
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying Massachusetts
law, reversed a lower court that had granted a corporation's motion to
dismiss.3 1 The appellate court remanded the case for a trial on the
merits.
30 2
A shareholder claimed that a board had wasted corporate assets to
protect directors' "lucrative" positions.30 3 The board had caused the de-
fendant corporation to purchase large blocks of its own stock at an in-
flated price and to sell the same stock at two-thirds of its appraised value
to a friendly investor who agreed to support management. 304 The court
reversed the lower court because the corporation failed to show that a
special litigation committee made a reasonable and good faith inquiry of
the shareholder's claims.3 °s
The sole-member special committee's report "demonstrate[d] sev-
eral significant business relationships between [him] and the defendants
.... )306 The business relationships, the court held, "preclude[d] any
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1284 n.6. Mills may be an anomaly. Other courts have refused to give section
14(a) claims such deference. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 731-32 (8th Cir.
1979) (applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F.
Supp. 684, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applying Delaware law); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.
Supp. 682, 691 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (section 14(a) claim "very weak"); Rosengarten v. ITT, 466
F. Supp. 817, 828-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also In re General Tire & Rubber Co., 726 F.2d
1075, 1082 (6th Cir.) (summary dismissal permitted where policies behind section 14(a) do not
clash with business judgment rule), cert denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984). See also supra note 81.
298. Mills, 544 F. Supp. at 1284 n.6.
299. Id. at 1287 n.17, 1290 n.27.
300. 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984).
301. Id. at 373.
302. Id. at 380.
303. Id. at 373.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 378.
306. Id. at 379.
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affirmative demonstration of disinterest. 30 7
Furthermore, the special committee failed to interview the compa-
nies from which the corporation had bought its own stock. Those inter-
views, the court held, "could have provided crucial evidence of the
purpose of that challenged transaction and the value of [the corpora-
tion's] transferred assets" and "further concrete evidence of... possible
self-interested motivation for the transaction."
308
5. North Carolina: Swenson v. Thibaut
30 9
The North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a lower court's deci-
sion denying a motion to dismiss. The shareholder complaint alleged
that directors had looted the corporation. 310 Among other things, the
shareholder alleged that the corporation bought worthless or overpriced
stock from, and made unsecured loans to, a majority shareholder.311
The special committee lacked independence. The appellate court
stated, "there appears of record no evidence that any independent judg-
ment was at any time exercised by the litigation evaluation committee in
regard to the derivative action claims."3" 2 The "litigation evaluation
committee" was only an advisory committee, whom director-defendants
had nominated and elected.313
In addition, the corporation had brought a motion to disqualify
plaintiff's counsel and voted that the derivative action had no merit
before appointing the litigation evaluation committee.314 The motion to
disqualify counsel, the court found, supported "an inference" that the
board (including the litigation evaluation committee) had decided to re-
sist the shareholders' suit before appointing the litigation evaluation
committee.315
6. Ohio: Holmstrom v. Coastal Industries, Inc.
316
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
denied a corporation's motion to dismiss because the court doubted the
"thoroughness of the [litigation oversight committee's] work" and a spe-
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279 (1978).
310. Id. at 107, 250 S.E.2d at 298.
311. Id. at 83-84 n.2, 250 S.E.2d at 284-85 n.2.
312. Id. at 107, 250 S.E.2d at 298.
313. Id. at 106, 250 S.E.2d at 297-98.
314. Id. at 90, 250 S.E.2d at 288.
315. Id. at 106-07, 250 S.E.2d at 298.
316. 645 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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cial committee's independence.317 A shareholder challenged the corpo-
ration's purchase of 390,000 shares of its common stock and redemption
of 800 shares of its preferred stock."' The corporation bought the stock
to avert a takeover.3 19 The shareholder claimed that the purchase served
no corporate purpose, wasted corporate assets, and entrenched
management.
320
The court found issues of fact on the special committee's indepen-
dence because the corporation's principal managing officer, who had pro-
posed that the board buy the stock, arranged for each of three special
committee members to serve on the special committee.321
In addition, the court found issues of fact on whether the special
committee thoroughly investigated the shareholders' claims. The special
committee members could not explain how they could recommend that
the corporation move to dismiss given a "blatant conflict of interest" that
permeated the transaction.322 Finally, the court noted that the special
committee deliberated for only six days after completing its investigation
before recommending dismissal.3 23
IV. SUMMARY
A. Special Litigation Committee
A board should appoint a special litigation committee to investigate
a shareholder's claims after a corporation makes standing or jurisdic-
tional objections, but before the board determines whether the claims
have merit. The board must delegate to the special committee full and
final authority to decide whether litigation is in the corporation's best
interests. A special committee should have more than one member.
Members should have reputations for solving complicated business
problems.
1. Interest in a challenged transaction
Special litigation committee members should have no personal inter-
est in a challenged transaction. Special committee members do not nec-
essarily have such an interest in a challenged transaction because they
served on a board, voted for the transaction, or because a shareholder
317. Id. at 988-89.
318. Id. at 985.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 988.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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named them as defendants. To raise an issue of interest, plaintiff must
charge special committee members with specific misconduct.
Conclusory allegations that a challenged transaction benefits a spe-
cial committee member also do not establish that the special committee
member has an interest in it. A plaintiff must show how a transaction
benefits a special committee member by pleading a factual and logical
nexus between a challenged transaction and an alleged benefit. Finally,
special committee members are not necessarily interested because they
have opinions on the merits of a lawsuit. A plaintiff must produce tangi-
ble evidence that special committee members have an untoward interest
in the outcome of litigation.
2. Independence from directors and a corporation
Special litigation committee members also must be independent
from a corporation and its management. General charges that special
committee members have relationships with director-defendants, a cor-
poration, a board or a majority stockholder does not raise an issue of
independence. Plaintiffs must specifically allege how such relationships
have influenced special committee members.
Yet, where a special litigation committee's investigation is inade-
quate on its face, a court may be suspicious of special committee mem-
bers' relationships with director-defendants. A court may find that
director-defendants influenced a special committee that failed adequately
to investigate-even if plaintiff fails to show how such relationships influ-
enced committee members.
B. Committee Work
Once appointed, a special committee, with special counsel, investi-
gates a shareholder's claims and writes a report evaluating whether liti-
gation is in the best interests of a corporation. How it does that work
affects whether a court will dismiss.
1. Investigating
To show that a special committee failed to investigate in good faith,
either a shareholder must prove that an investigation is a sham (or the
corporation must prove that it is not a sham, depending upon what state
law governs). Thus, plaintiffs attempt to show that special committees
failed to investigate thoroughly plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs criticize the
length, scope and record of such investigations, as well as the relative
participation of special committee members, special counsel, plaintiff and
[Vol. 24:1
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defendants. A shareholder can show bad faith if special committee mem-
bers are unfamiliar with or cannot explain their conclusions.
Special committee members need not do equal work. A special
committee need not attend to every detail or redo a corporation's re-
search, but a special committee may not blindly rely on others' work.
Special counsel may conduct much of an investigation. Defendants or a
corporation may even participate, although the better practice is to avoid
involving them, especially in witness interviews. Shareholders have no
right to participate in an investigation.
2. Reporting
A special litigation committee culminates its investigation in a re-
port to a corporation. The report is crucial. Without an analysis (or if
an analysis is faulty), a court may refuse to dismiss a shareholder's ac-
tion. If a special committee recommends dismissal, a report must show
why litigation is not in a corporation's best interests. A committee
should discuss, if true, that litigation probably will fail, will cost more
than a corporation could hope to recover, and will unduly interrupt busi-
ness and undermine morale.
A court decides whether a special committee's report and its exhib-
its become public documents. Courts generally release the report. Even
if a corporation is successful in sealing a report, it may be protected only
until a court concludes dismissal proceedings.
C. Plaintiffs Discovery
While a special committee investigates and prepares its report, a
court stays the shareholder litigation, including discovery. A share-
holder cannot even challenge a special committee's qualifications until a
special committee issues its report. A court determines how long a stay
should last. When it lifts a stay, a court usually limits discovery to a
special committee's independence and disinterest and to whether a spe-
cial committee's investigation and conclusions are reasonable.
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